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The Law as Stimulus:
The Role of Law in Fostering
Innovative Entrepreneurship
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Abstract: As we weather the deepest recession in recent
times, lawmakers everywhere search for mechanisms to
revive the economy. This paper argues that in addition to
financial stimuli, the law, too, has substantial, yet
underutilized capacity to foster economic growth. In
particular I examine the legal system's potential to facilitate
innovative entrepreneurship in difficult economic times. In
Part II of the paper I suggest three distinct roles - leveling,
protecting, and enabling - that law can play to foster
entrepreneurship. Part III develops a comprehensiveframework for crafting laws that facilitate
entrepreneurship based on the theory of risk. Utilizing
expected utility theory I explain why lawmakers may want
to focus less on direct financial losses or gains for
entrepreneurs (like subsidies or tax breaks), and more on
information by improving the predictability of legal
processes. Insights from behavioral economics take this
one step further by suggesting lawmakers need to be careful
how they frame laws intended to facilitate
entrepreneurship. Such a risk-based framework rests on
two important assumptions: that the linearity of the
innovation process and the central importance of the
individual entrepreneur rarely happen in practice. Thus,
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Part IV of the paper shows how through a more nuanced
understanding of innovation, law may take on a
significantly more active role: not be conceptualized as
static and exogenous, but potentially entrepreneurial in
nature, thereby actively creating market tensions that
entrepreneurs then successfully exploit. More research is
needed to better understand such an active role of the law,
but it could offer lawmakers a much more powerful tool at
their disposal to shape entrepreneurial activity in our
nation than has been thought so far.
I. INTRODUCTION
In late 2008 and 2009, the world economy suffered a severe and
sharp recession. Economic output shrunk at an unprecedented rate.
Around the world, governments enacted massive programs to
resuscitate the economy, to stimulate demand, and to revive
entrepreneurial activity.' In this article I suggest, perhaps counter-
intuitively, that the legal system may provide an additional, yet ill-
understood and hence underutilized mechanism to stimulate domestic
entrepreneurship, one of the central pillars in revitalizing economic
growth.
More than sixty years ago, Joseph A. Schumpeter famously
described entrepreneurs as the ones who successfully bring to market
an invention.2 Schumpeter saw the entrepreneur as somebody who
disdains equilibrium and breaks the rules of the establishment.3 His
1 See Economic Stimulus Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-185, 122 Stat. 613 (2oo8). For
Australia, see Emma Rodgers, Stimulus package passes Senate, ABC NEWS, Feb. 13, 2009,
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/02/13/249o674.htm (last visited Apr. 18,
201o). For the UK, see William L. Watts, Britain unveils tax cuts, stimulus measures,
MARKETWATCH, NOV. 24, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/uk-unveils-30-
billion-stimulus-plan (last visited Apr. 18, 2010). For Germany, see Gesetz zur Sicherung
von Beschdftigung und Stabilitdt in Deutschland, BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER FINANZEN,
http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_6912o/DE/BMFStartseite/Aktuelles/Akt
uelleGesetze/Gesetze Verordnungen/o31_Konjunkturpaket_2.html?_nnn=true
(last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
2 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (5th ed. 1976). In this
paper I focus on entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense, not on those that found
businesses without offering something new (more correctly called self-employment), and
not on activities in the non-profit sector, and not on activities within a large organization
(often called "intrapreneurship") (Karina S. Christensen, Enabling Intrapreneurship: The
Case of a Knowledge-Intensive Industrial Company, 8 EUR. J. INNOVATION MGMT. 305(2005)).
3SCHUMPETER, supra note 2, at 74.
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entrepreneurs disrupt existing market balances by introducing new
products, new methods of production, devising new business models,
or opening new markets.4 In contrast, the legal system seems to
constrain activity and to set rules. Entrepreneurs are seen as
disdaining such rules, and do not hesitate to break them. Law
promises certainty. Entrepreneurs thrive on risk.
This article focuses on the apparent tension between
entrepreneurship and the law, and examines the relationship more
generally before suggesting an alternative conceptualization of how
law stimulates rather than stifles entrepreneurial activities.s Part II
questions the popular view of law choking entrepreneurship and
suggests three ways the legal system may be employed to facilitate
entrepreneurial activity. Part III develops a more complete
framework of entrepreneurial activity based on risk that offers a
conceptual understanding of how law can foster entrepreneurial
activity. However, such frameworks portraying the legal system as
performing a purely supportive role are vulnerable to fundamental
criticism. Hence, I suggest in part IV that the interaction between
entrepreneurship and law must be rethought. To that end, I look at
the innovation dynamic and offer an alternative viewpoint by
suggesting that elements of entrepreneurship be injected into law
itself. Part V briefly concludes highlighting the much richer dynamic
between innovative entrepreneurship and the law.
II. ANALYZING AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP
Given the desire of the modern state to regulate many areas of
human activity, it is easy to understand what Schumpeter has
characterized as entrepreneurs' disdain for law. Consider the
following limitations that law may impose on entrepreneurship:
4 SCHUMPETER, supra note 2, at 83, 132. See also David M. Hart, Entrepreneurship Policy:
What It Is and Where It Came From, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY:
GOVERNANCE, START-UPS, AND GROWTH IN THE U.S. KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 5 (David M.
Hart ed., 2003); D. Gordon Smith & Masako Ueda, Can Silicon Valley Be Cloned?, 1
ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 231, 232 (2006).
5 For earlier works on entrepreneurship and the law, see Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a
Theory of Law & Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U.L. REV 241 (1997); Amir N. Licht, The
Entrepreneurial Spirit and What the Law Can Do About It, 28 COMP. LABOR LAW & POLY
JOURNAL 817 (2007); Viktor Mayer-Schdnberger, E-Commerce, Entrepreneurship and the
Law: Reassessing a Relationship, THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY, supra
note 4, at 195; Simon C. Parker, Law and the Economics of Entrepreneurship, 28 COMP.
LAB. L. & POL'YrJ. 695 (2007); Smith & Ueda, supra note 4.
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* Labor laws may restrict the ability of start-ups
to hire and fire as their business situation
demands. 6  Rules regarding notice and
severance payments may increase the cost of
human resources at precipitous moments in a
fledging company's life.7 Legal restrictions on
stock option grants may limit entrepreneurs'
ability to attract top talent without incurring
significant cost.8
* Health and safety regulations make product
development more cumbersome and time-
6 Hiring practices are particularly impacted by antidiscrimination laws. Key federal
antidiscrimination statutes include Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 20000-2000e-17 (2007)), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. §§
621-634 (2007)), and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (2007)). Many states have also passed anti-discrimination provisions specifically
applicable to small businesses. See FRED S. STEINGOLD, THE EMPLOYERS LEGAL HANDBOOK
(t ed. 2005). Although the "employment-at-will" doctrine that governs termination of
employment relationships affords considerable freedom in firing decisions, many statutory
and common law protections curtail this freedom. The statutory protections stem broadly
from the federal antidiscrimination statutes as well as more narrow provisions, such as
restrictions on termination due to filing of workers' compensation or other claims. See
Elletta S. Callahan, Employment at Will: The Relationship Between Societal Expectations
and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. L.J. 455, 457-58 (1990). Common law protections include
imposing a duty of good faith and fair dealing, public policy exceptions and implied-in-fact
contract terms. Lindsay B. Jackson, A Lesson From Germany on How the United States
Could Reform Its Laws on Dismissal, 4 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 522, 532-34 (2006); see
also Parker, supra note 5, at 704-05.
71n the US, severance and notice provisions are of particular significance in many standard
form contract provisions and collective bargaining agreements. However, current reform
proposals such as the Model Employment Termination Act would incorporate much more
stringent severance and notice provisions. See Daniel J. Libenson, Leasing Human
Capital: Toward a New Foundation for Employment Termination Law, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 111 (2006).
8 For a general discussion on stock option based compensation, see William Lazonick, The
Innovative Firm, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 29, 46-49 (Jan Fagerberg,
David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson eds., 2oo5). Regulatory restrictions on stock
options include mandatory expensing of option grants (Accounting for Stock-Based
Compensation, FASB 123 (1995)), required shareholder ratification of option grants as
executive compensation, and compensation committee requirements (I.R.C. § 162(m)
(2007); NYSE Listed Company Manual Section 303A.o8 (2004); NASD Manual R. 4350(i)
(2005)).
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consuming, especially in the life sciences.9
Moreover, specific privacy laws for health and
financial services, for example, may prevent
entrepreneurs from reusing and linking
personal data for targeted marketing or resale
to other corporations, thus reducing the value
of data the entrepreneur has collected at
significant cost.'0 Consumer protection laws
may limit what business transactions
entrepreneurs can engage in when the other
party is a consumer. Product liability laws may
force entrepreneurs to take out expensive
insurance policies to protect themselves from
costly tort claims."
* Intellectual property laws reduce what new
products and services entrepreneurs can offer.
Incumbent producers may use their patents,
copyrights, and trademarks to prevent or hinder
new products and services that threaten their
9 The bulk of general U.S. health and safety regulation is found in the Food and Drug Act,
codified in Title 21 of the United States Code. These regulations are particularly onerous
for life sciences companies such as pharmaceuticals, where the average cost of clinical
testing per drug is about $0.5 billion and only one of five drugs submitted to such testing
are approved by the FDA. ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2004).
10 Examples include the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2007)), the
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952
(2003) (amending the FCRA to create more stringent measures against identity theft by
increasing consumer opt-out rights)), the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ((16 C.F.R. pt. 313
(2000) (limiting when financial institutions may disclose nonpublic consumer information
to nonaffiliated third parties)), and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 ((Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1036 (1996) (limiting disclosure of consumer
medical information)).
n1 Key federal consumer protection statutes include the Magnuson-Moss Consumer
Warranty Act (15 U.S.C.S. ch. 50 (2007)), the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C.
ch. 41 (2007)), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2007)), the Truth
in Lending Act (TILA) (15 U.S.C. § 16oi et. seq. (2007)), and Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. pt.
226 (2007) (implementing TILA)). Examples of product liability statutes include the
Consumer Product Safety Act (i5 U.S.C. ch. 47 (2007)) and the Federal Hazardous
Substance Act (15 U.S.C.S. § 1261).
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market position.12 Even a sufficiently novel
service may run into severe legal troubles if
courts see it as encouraging others to impede on
existing intellectual property rights.13
* Entrepreneurs may violate criminal statutes by
offering certain information or services in
jurisdictions where these are prohibited. This
goes far beyond questionable business areas
such as porn and gambling. Even mainline
entrepreneurial stalwarts like AOL14 have at
times been threatened with criminal
prosecution.
* Limitations placed on venture funding, initial
public offerings, and mergers may make it
harder and more costly for entrepreneurs to sell
or fund their ventures. Stringent procedures
12 For example, Apple's iPod fell victim to Creative Technology's "Zen Patent." See
Christopher Breen, $100 million payment ends all pending litigation: Apple settles
Creative lawsuits, MACWORLD, Nov. 1, 2006, at 20. Similarly, Research in Motion (RIM)
faced a high-profile patent infringement suit by over the Blackberry. See NTP, Inc. v.
Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
13 A classic case is the litigation over the use of the Sony Betamax to record television
programs. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
For more recent examples, see In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litigation, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 5836 (9th Cir.); A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d lo91 (9th Cir. 2002);
Joshua Chaffin & Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson, Music groups notch up piracy victory:
Illegal downloads, FIN'L TIMES, July 28, 2006, at 7; MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
545 U.S. 913 (2005)); Atlantic Recording Corp. v. XM Satellite Radio, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4290 (S.D.N.Y.)). Another product speculated to trigger possible litigation is the
"Slingbox." See Karen Brown, Mobile gets into the Hollywood picture, MULTICHANNEL
NEWS, Sept. 18, 2006, at 12; see also Gary Shapiro, Fair use: protecting innovation,
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2oo7/tc20070313_858999.htm
(last visited Apr. 18, 2010)).
14 Compuserve, an AOL subsidiary, was prosecuted in Germany for disseminating on-line
pornography. See Silvia Ascarelli & Kimberley A. Strassel, Two German Cases Show How
Europe Still Is Struggling to Regulate Internet, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1997, at B9; "Sex on
the Internet," THE ECONOMIST, January 6, 1996, p. 18, where the author inquires, "[w]hen
Bavaria wrinkles its nose, must the whole world catch a cold?" See generally Ulrich Sieber,
Strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit fiir den Datenverkehr in internationalen
Computernetzen, JZ 429 (1996).
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and reporting requirements, like those required
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,'s are said to cost
companies an average of one percent of
revenue.' 6
Not surprisingly, many entrepreneurs view the legal system as
their enemy. 17 Nothing summarizes this better than a line from Apple
Computer's famous advertisement "Think Different." The ad features
a number of short clips depicting famous artists, Nobel laureates,
scientists, societal leaders, and successful entrepreneurs. In the
background, a somber narrating voice characterizes them all as people
who see things differently, change society and push "the human race
forward."' 8 The narrator emphasizes that these trailblazers "are not
fond of rules, and they have no respect for the status quo."19
Conceived this way, entrepreneurs, like their colleagues in the arts and
sciences, cannot help but break the rules and violate the codes of the
status quo. That is their defining quality. The law is seen as holding
them back and thereby preventing them - and society - from reaching
their full potential.
Describing the relationship between entrepreneurs and the law in
entirely antagonistic terms obscures the complex relationship between
the two. In at least three ways, the legal system can facilitate
15 Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
16 "Hackett: Sarbanes-Oxley Drives Biggest Finance Cost Rise in 13 Years," DMReview,
September 27, 2005, available at
http://www.dmreview.com/articlesub.cfm?articleld=1038128 (last visited Apr. 18,
2010); cf. "Restoring the shine," THE ECONOMIST, November 30, 2006.
17 See e.g., Richard Goossen, What Entrepreneurs and their Lawyers Should Know about
Each Other, 3 MINN. J. Bus. L. & ENTREP. 3, 5-6 (2004).
is Video: "Think Different" Advertisement by Apple, http://www.youtube.com/watchv=
jULUGHJCCj4 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
19 Id.
2010] 159
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
entrepreneurial activity.20 Law can be a leveler, a protector, and an
enforcer.21
A. LAW AS LEVELER
Not every new regulation limits what entrepreneurs can do.22 On
the contrary, regulations can create windows of opportunity for
entrepreneurs to enter existing markets or create new ones. Since at
least the 1970s, many entrepreneurs have first advocated for and then
welcomed the "liberalization" of specific economic sectors. In
particular, this liberalization has swept through network industries.
For example, airlines were deregulated in the United States in the late
1970s. 23 New airlineS were started, competition heated up, and ticket
prices came down.24 Just a few years later, AT&T's
telecommunications monopoly was broken, mostly through legal and
regulatory measures.2 5 Successful old-fashioned monopolies and cozy
20 For a recent view that law does not matter much for entrepreneurial activity, see Jeffrey
M. Lipshaw, Why the Law ofEntrepreneurship Barely Matters: Rules, Cognition, and the
Antinomies of Transactional Practice (2007), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=954400 (last visited Apr. 18, 2olo).
The following section draws from Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, E-Commerce,
Entrepreneurship and the Law, in THE EMERGENCE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY 193,
196-208 (David Hart ed., 2003).
22 Commentators haven often argued that regulations are detrimental to markets; cf.
Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, Commissioner, Federal Communication Commission, Before
the National Association of Broadcasters, Radio Show Financial Breakfast, October 15,
1998, http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Furchtgott _Roth/sphfr815.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2010) ("regulation is an impediment to markets. And excessive regulation, frankly,
destroys markets."). It is important to note, however, that even if a regulation is a market
impediment under classical economic theory, it may facilitate entrepreneurial activity and
thus be beneficial in a Schumpeterian (and Hayekian) view of the market; see infra notes
69-70 and accompanying text.
23 See Roger Sherman, The Future ofMarket Regulation, 67S. ECON. J. 782, 788-90
(2001) (discussing history leading up to the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978).
24 While not all passenger fares are lower than pre-deregulation, studies show that airline
fares are roughly 25% lower than what would be expected under regulation. Steven A.
Morrison & Clifford Winston, The Remaining Role for Government Policy in The
Deregulated Airline Industry, in DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT?
(Sam Peltzman & Clifford Winston eds., 2000); see Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in various sections of 49 U.S.C.).
25 See U.S. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.C. 1982); see Sherman, supra note 23,
at 792-93 (discussing telecommunications deregulation in the United States); see also
[Vol. 6:2160o
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oligopolies have been replaced with vibrant markets that offer higher
quality goods and services at lower prices.26
The energy sector and postal services, too, have seen deregulation
on both sides of the Atlantic over the past few decades, and so has rail
transport in Europe.27 The financial services sector and, to a lesser
extent, the professional services industry have experienced similar
changes,28 albeit with a dramatically different outcome for the
economy.
For entrepreneurs, the story may look simple: once burdensome
regulations that fostered and facilitated non-competitive market
conditions were abolished, entrepreneurial spirit and Adam Smith's
invisible hand took over. Little surprise then that the process is often
termed "liberalization" or "deregulation," as if markets needed to be
liberated from stifling regulatory measures.
Such a view, however, overlooks that competitiveness is not
necessarily a natural condition to which markets automatically revert
once a stifling regulatory framework has been lifted. Some markets
tend to favor first movers, large players, and incumbents, making it
hard for entrepreneurs to take root. Abolishing the existing regulatory
ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE
COMPETITIVE ERA (1991).
26 See C. Eldering, Impact and Results of Telecommunications Deregulation, 37 IEEE
COMMUNICATION MAGAZINE 98 (1999); cf. Sharon Reier, Businesses Likely to Save Most:
Who Stand to Win Deregulation Payoff, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 1997
(reporting that in France long distance rates had been increased by 25 and 40 percent in
subsequent years); for Latin America, see Telephone Calls, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2002.
27 See Sherman, supra note 23, at 793-96 (discussing electricity deregulation in the United
States); John Kay, et. al., Regulatory Reform in Britain, 3 ECONOMIC POLICY 285, 292-96
(1988) (discussing utilities deregulation in the United Kingdom); J. GREGORY SIDAK,
GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE (1995) (discussing regulation of the United States Postal
Service); Adrienne H6rtier, Public-Interest Services Revisited, 9 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 995,
996-1003, oo6-07(2002) (discussing deregulation of rail transport in Great Britain,
Germany and France and deregulation of the postal service in Germany); and Ernst R.
Berndt, et. al., Cost Effect of Mergers and Deregulation in the U.S. Railroad Industry, 4 J.
PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 127 (1993) (discussing deregulation of the railroad industry in the
United States).
28 See Henry N. Pontell & Kitty Calavita, The Savings and Loan Industry, 18 CRIME AND
JUSTICE 203, 205-10 (1993) (discussing deregulation in the U.S. savings and loan
industry); Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics
and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114 Q.J. ECON. 1437 (1999)
(discussing deregulation of commercial banks in the United States); and Ernst
Baltensperger, et. al., Banking Deregulation in Europe, 2 ECON. POL'Y 63 (1987)
(discussing deregulation of the banking industry in Europe).
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framework in such markets would likely strengthen the incumbents'
grip, not bring more competition.
Berkeley professor Stephen Vogel and others have demonstrated
eloquently that markets often require not a legal void to be
successfully "liberalized," but rather a skillfully crafted and carefully
implemented legal framework that offers newcomers a chance to enter
and stay competitive. What is necessary is not deregulation, but
reregulation - replacing the existing regulatory framework that
permitted uncompetitive market conditions to prevail with a
regulatory setup that facilitates the introduction of competitive forces,
but without creating perverse incentives.
At first glance, this may sound counterintuitive. But where a
sector is dominated by powerful monopolies or oligopolies, merely
abolishing the existing regulatory framework may leave new entrants
vulnerable to be squashed by powerful incumbents. This is
particularly true for network industries - like telecommunications,
energy and transport - which require new entrants to build up a
network infrastructure that incumbents have already put in place and
paid for through quasi-monopoly rents.30
Left to the market, incumbents could engage in a price war with
new entrants that they - with greater resources and an already
existing network - would likely win. Moreover, in many markets,
such as telecommunications, new entrants generally need to connect
to the networks of incumbents at a reasonable price. Without
regulations to force incumbents to allow such linkages, potential
challengers can be stopped before they even begin. Successful
reregulation takes into account these power imbalances by restricting
what incumbents can do to head off competition.
At the same time, as the disaster in deregulating the financial
services sector demonstrates, new entrants must not receive
preferential treatment above and beyond the rebalancing necessitated
by the previous monopolistic market power of incumbents. If they do,
they fail to create a sustainable entrepreneurial alternative in the
market.31 The challenge of reregulation is to find the appropriate
29 See STEVEN K. VOGEL, FREER MARKETS, MORE RULES - REGULATORY REFORM IN
ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES (1996).
30 See DEREGULATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES: WHAT'S NEXT?, supra note 24.
31 This points towards a debate among economists about the role of monopolistic rights for
entrepreneurs. Schumpeter favored giving entrepreneurs monopolies over their ideas, for
example in the form of patent rights, for a limited period of lime as a societal incentive for
entrepreneurs to innovate. Schumpeter, supra note 2, at 8i-io6. However, Schumpeter
has been disputed on this point. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of
[Vol. 6:2162
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balance that offers incentives for all market players, incumbents and
new entrants.
Consequently, a re-regulatory framework must fulfill two tasks.
First, it must replace the old, noncompetitive setup by opening a
sector to entrepreneurial entrants. Second, it must set out a
framework that ensures sustainable competition (and not ill-founded
"bubbles"), even when the new entrants have become powerful players
themselves. Thus, Stephen Vogel entitled his book Freer Markets,
More Rules.32
Many entrepreneurs have benefited from new regulatory
frameworks. America West was able to enter the airline market and
grow into one of the United States' largest airlines after the
reregulation of the airline industry.33 Nextel was able to seize a
sizeable portion of the mobile communication market thanks to
reregulation.34 New internet access providers and network operators
exist because of the re-regulation of the telecommunications sector,
whereas resellers of excess energy are enabled by similar
developments in the energy markets. The reregulation of financial
services in the United States, while highly problematic in fostering
unchecked securitization, made it possible for e-commerce companies
to offer bundles of services not based on artificial regulatory
categories, but on their customers' comprehensive financial needs.35
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE AcrivrY 609 (Richard
Nelson ed., 1962). For a re-conceptualization of the debate, see Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond
Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=962261 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
32 VOGEL, supra note 29; I have amplified Vogel's point repeatedly in my writings. See
David Lazer and Viktor Mayer-Schbnberger, Telecommunications Developments in the
European Union: Governing Networks: Telecommunication Deregulation in Europe
and the United States, 27 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 819 (2001); Viktor Mayer-Schdnberger &
Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at Telecom Deregulation: The European Advantage, 12
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 561 (1999).
33 For a summary of America West Airlines successful business history see America West
Airlines, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/America WestAirlines#History (last visited Apr.
18, 2010).
34 For a summary of Nextel's successful business history, see Milestone Events Making
Sprint History, http://www.sprint.com/companyinfo/history/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
35 See Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1388
(1999) (deregulation in the face of modem technology); Conrad S. Ciccotello, C. Terry
Grant & Mark Dickie, Will Consult for Food! Rethinking Barriers to Professional Entry in
the Information Age, 40 AM. Bus. L.J. 905 (2003); see also VOGEL, supra note 29, at 31-
35.
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In many European nations, new entrants, especially in the digital and
mobile telephony sector, have overtaken the former incumbent phone
companies.
While such leveling has become more frequent in recent years, it is
not an invention of our times. For example, the legal invention of the
modern patent system36 already contained an important element of
leveling by requiring patented inventions to be disclosed to the
public.37 To be afforded legal protection, even large firms had to
disclose the inner workings of their new inventions for others to study
and to learn from.38
B. LAW AS PROTECTOR
Markets, as Judge Easterbrook reminds us, require property rights
to function as efficient allocation mechanisms for scarce resources.39
The term property rights signifies that it is not enough to have actual
physical control over a particular good if others are not also prohibited
from using force to simply take one's belonging. Instead, what is
needed is the acceptance by the people that property rights can only
be transferred voluntarily from one person to another, and that a
societal institution - the legal system - will use force to help those
who have legitimate property rights regain physical possession if
necessary.
The advent of patent laws as part of industrialization in the
nineteenth century extended the idea of property from physical goods
to intellectual ones - to the realm of ideas. Through patents,
knowledge can be turned into quasi-property, affording the originator
of an idea exclusive rights to it for a limited period of time.4o The
36 See e.g., the U.S.' first Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (April lo, 1790).
37 Ove Granstrand, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INNOVATION 280 (Jan Fagerberg, David C. Mowery & Richard R. Nelson
eds., 2005); see also J. Ordover, A Patent System for Both Diffusion and Exclusion, 5
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 43 (1991).
38 In practice, however, the patent disclosure requirement has limited impact. See Suzanne
Scotchmer, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 70 (2004).
39 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
212-13 (1996); see also Peter J. Boettke & Christopher J. Coyne, Entrepreneurship and
Development: Cause or Consequence?, 6 ADVANCES IN AUSTRIAN EcoN. 67 (2003)
(suggesting that "well-defined property rights" are one of two most important institutions
for encouraging entrepreneurship).
40 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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societal reason for granting patents was utilitarian: lawmakers hoped
that it would provide a powerful incentive for entrepreneurs to come
up with great new products and production processes. In granting
exclusive rights over such ideas, lawmakers wished to ensure that
inventors would take their ideas and bring them to market, thereby
furthering overall economic growth and development.41 Because of
this utilitarian intention, patent rights only protected applied
knowledge that led directly to a novel product or production process.
In contrast, basic scientific knowledge remained un-patentable, and
thus available for everybody to use.4 2  Copyright and related
intellectual property rights have joined patent rights in granting the
creator a temporary exclusive right.43
These intellectual property rights have become a major driver of
entrepreneurial activity.44 Stock market valuations of chip designers
and software companies, for example, are premised upon their patent
and copyright claims, much like pharmaceutical and biotech
companies' values are based on their holdings of drug patents.45
Supposedly low-tech consumer companies are built on brand, which
in no small part rests on trademark law.46 The ability to effectively
protect one's intellectual creations through the legal system and not
through one's sheer power in the market provides entrepreneurs an
41See Granstrand, supra note 377, at 278-84 (discussing the role of IPRs in innovation
systems); JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 9, at 52-55 (discussing how the patent system is
"supposed to work").
42WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, 305-08 (2003).
43 See Granstrand, supra note 377, at 266-78 (discussing the historical developments in
intellectual property rights). See also LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 294-97
(discussing the relationship between patents and copyrights).
44 See Joshua S. Gans & Scott Stem, Incumbency and R&D Incentives: Licensing the Gale
of Creative Destruction, 4 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRAT. 9 (2000); Smith & Ueda, supra note 3,
at 236; Masako Ueda, Banks versus Venture Capital: Project Evaluation, Screening, and
Expropriation, 59 J. FIN. 6oi (2004).
45 See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and
Patent Citations: A First Look (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7741,
2000), available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w7741 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010); see
also Ueda, supra note 44.
46 Trademark law thus has taken on a quasi-property role, despite the fact that it originally
has a consumer protection bend.
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important incentive to innovate, as Kenneth Arrow argued many years
ago.47
Some have suggested that intellectual property rights are primarily
used by large corporations to keep others, especially new entrants, out
of lucrative markets.48 To be sure, there is evidence that the current
patent system in the United States has made possible the filing of so-
called "defensive patents" that insulate established players in the
market from competitive forces.49 These and related developments in
patent law may be in need of correction.5o Yet, overall the system
seems to have tilted in favor of startups and entrepreneurs rather than
against them. Kevin Rivette and David Kline have shown that while in
1972 entrepreneurs only accounted for five percent of all patent
applications, by 1992 their share had grown to 23 percent, more than
quadrupling their portion in the overall pool of new patent
applications.51 Numerous cases attest that these entrepreneurial
Davids have successfully employed the law to win hundreds of
millions of dollars in patent suits against powerful Goliaths like
Microsoft, Apple, and General Electric.52 While these facts do not
47 See Arrow, supra note 31; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42.
48 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 9.
49 For example, a patent attorney for Hewlett Packard was quoted as saying "We get
patents not to protect our own products, but because it gives us power to exclude in areas
where others might want to participate." Pui-wing Tam, More Patents Please! Tech
Companies Urge Staffers to Submit Innovative Ideas; Cash Awards, Plaques at H-P,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,2002, at Bi; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 42, at 320-22 (reviewing
recent literature on "defensive patents").
50 See generally JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 9; Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Is
Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 BERKELEY L.J. 1155 (2002); Julie E. Cohen and Mark
A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REVIEW 1
(2001); Mark D. Janis, Patent System Reform: Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 899 (2002); Mark A. Lemley, What to Do About Bad Patents?, 28 REGULATION 4(2005); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U.L. REV 1495(2001); Beth S. Noveck, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and
Patent Reform, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 123 (2oo6); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy:
A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1035
(2003).
5' KEVIN G. RVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ArIC 18 (2000).
52 See Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(reversing and remanding summary judgment against ergonomic keyboard patent holder);
see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Articulate Sys., Inc., 234 F.3d 14 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(reversing invalidation of the patent of a graphical interface company); Reiffin v. Microsoft
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prove that intellectual property laws have only benefited
entrepreneurs53, they show the potential of these laws to assist
entrepreneurs in their activities.
Much has been written lately about the weaknesses of our current
intellectual property rights regime.54 In particular, some claim that
overbroad patents have stifled some entrepreneurial activity.55 These
arguments may have some merit. I am not defending the current
intellectual property regime. My argument is more limited: given the
desire of entrepreneurs to achieve economic success, dangling the
carrot of exclusive economic exploitation of knowledge has acted as a
powerful incentive for entrepreneurs to innovate.
Corp., 214 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing and remanding summary judgment
against spell check software programmer); Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversed trial court's finding of non-infringement of patent on magnetic
resource imaging technique); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d
1240 (3rd Cir. 1984) (reversing order denying hardware entrepreneur preliminary
injunction).
53 Recently, patent trolls, patent holders who enforce their patents without actually
intending to bring their invention to market, have become scrutinized. Whether patent
trolls are problematic, and to what extent such behavior occurs is contested. Cf. JEFFREY
H. MATSUURA, JEFFERSON VS. THE PATENT TROLLS: A POPULIST VISION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008) (arguing patent trolls violate the Jeffersonian ideal underlying
patent protection) with James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An
Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J.
189 (2006) (suggesting that even pure patent enforcement performs a positive function).
54 See, e.g., the works cited in note 50 supra. See also YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF
NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006);
WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF
ENTERTAINMENT (2004); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES
TECHNOLOGY AND LAw TO LOCK DOwN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004);
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD
(2001); JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ON
THE INTERNET (2000); Neil W. Netanel, The Law and Economics of Intellectual Property
Rights: Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L.
REV. 1879 (2000).
55 See Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 113 (1990); Josh Lerner, The Importance of Patent Scope: An Economic Analysis,
25 RAND. J. ECON. 2 (1994); David Silverstein, Patents, Science and Innovation:
Historical Linkages and Implications for Global Technological Competitiveness, 17
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 261, 264-66 (1991).
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C. LAW AS ENFORCER
Law fulfills a third, potentially useful, function for entrepreneurs:
the enforcement of contractual obligations. When market participants
transact with each other, they need to trust that the counterparty will
fulfill its contractual duties. Such trust can be established many
different ways. One way is through repeated positive personal
experiences and interactions - for example, a company's reputation
for fair dealing is built over time.s6 Parties may also decide to find a
"trust substitute," such as another person who acts as a guarantor. In
our society, the legal system is the principal societal "trust
substitute."s? It permits buyers and sellers to contract without having
to first establish a trust necessary for a mutual willingness to execute.
Instead, parties rely on the threat of legal action to coerce the other
side to perform, or at least pay damages caused by its
nonperformance.s8 Law enables us to transact with others that we do
not know, that we have not met, or that live far away.
All market participants require such trust, but some are more
exposed to the risk that their business partners will not perform as
promised. Large and established corporations, for example, can limit
their risk by spreading it across many different transactional partners.
If one fails to perform, the loss is contained. Entrepreneurs with a
small number of clients and suppliers are much more dependent on
their partners. Non-performance by a partner may cause serious
financial losses to a fledgling startup. In addition, unlike
entrepreneurs, established companies already know whom to trust,
based on their past experiences. Large corporations also have
economic power at their disposal to persuade businesses partners into
compliance. Entrepreneurs, on the other hand, do not yet have such
transactional experience and economic power and thus have to rely
more on the legal system to enforce contracts at relatively reasonable
costs.
Recently, alternative mechanisms, such as credit card companies
or alternative dispute resolution (ADR), have become more common
s6 Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trust Relationships: Trusting and Trustworthiness,
81 B.U. L. REV. 523, 527 (2001).
57 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 27
(1995). See also Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457 (2005) (discussing
generally the interaction of trust and the law).
58 FUKUYAMA, supra note 57, at 311.
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and act as a trust surrogate at lower cost than the law. As a result,
some have suggested that the legal system may lose some of its role as
enforcer.59 However, while such mechanisms have made impressive
gains in some sectors, overall, the law still maintains its position. This
is especially so because the legal system does not only enforce
individual contracts through a formal procedure. It also acts as a
promoter of good behavior by sending a powerful signal to all market
participants that violating a contractual promise risks costly societal
enforcement.60 This societal signaling reduces noncompliance, thus
lowering transactional risk for compliant market participants.
Furthermore, the law as a trust surrogate enforces the property rights
it protects and thus validates and encourages the use of markets as a
legitimate institution and commercial transactions as a legitimate
mechanism to allocate scarce resources. This in turn, as economists
have maintained, ensures overall efficiency in the allocation process. 6'
In sum, the legal system can help entrepreneurs by enforcing the
contracts they have with their business partners. The law reduces the
risk of noncompliance, thus offsetting some of the disadvantages
entrepreneurs are exposed to because their size prevents them from
spreading the risk among many contractual partners. Finally,
compared with alternative risk enforcement mechanisms, like
economic power, the law is readily available to entrepreneurs at
relatively low cost.62
59See Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Homo Economicus, Homo Myopicus and the
Law and Economics of Consumer Choice: Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REv.
157 (20o6); Johanna Harrington, To Litigate or Arbitrate? No Matter -The Credit Card
Industry Is Deciding For You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 101 (2001).
6o See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000).
61See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960) (going further by
suggesting that the initial assignment of property rights does not diminish the overall
efficiency of the system as long as transactional costs are minimal).
62 My argument here rests on the solid foundations of Douglass North and the school of
New Institutional Economics; see, e.g., EIRIK FURUBOTN & RUDOLF RICHTER, INSTITUTIONS
AND ECONOMIC THEORY: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (2d
ed. 2005); my argument follows the one made by my former colleague Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes and his co-authors Rafael La Porta, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny ("LLSV") on
the importance of legal institutions for economic development. See Rafael La Porta et al.,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law
and Finance, io6 J. POL. ECoN. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et ad, Corporate Ownership
Around the World, 54 J. FIN 471 (1999).
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III. A FRAMEWORK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND LAW'S ROLE IN IT 63
In Part II of this article, I laid out three arguments of how the legal
system can facilitate entrepreneurship. Yet, these arguments do not
tell us much about exactly what kind of legal rules influence
entrepreneurship. Almost any legal rule may at one level or another
impact entrepreneurs and thus influence entrepreneurial activity. In
the following I suggest a framework to conceptualize how law shapes
entrepreneurial activity more directly by analyzing the role of risk and
the role of law.
A. THE ROLE OF RISK
All humans make decisions based on a subjective, sometimes
perfunctory, analysis of the risks and rewards their decisions entail.
Successful entrepreneurs are no different. Yet they are somehow
better than the average human. Their decisions result in higher gains.
Understanding why is important as it may uncover how society can
better facilitate entrepreneurship if it so desires, including through the
legal system. Three reasons are conceivable to explain entrepreneurs'
successes.
First, entrepreneurs may be less risk averse than others, reaping
the benefits of their more risk-taking behavior. 64 Their success would
rest on their increased willingness to take risks. Second, one could
argue that the difference lies not in the willingness to take risks but in
the information available for decision-making. While entrepreneurs
may not have complete information, they may have more or better
information than others, with the resulting informational advantage
explaining their successes. Third, entrepreneurial success may rest on
an evaluation advantage. Entrepreneurs may take the same risks and
have access to the same information as others, but win because they
are better able to evaluate risks and rewards. Let us take a look at
each of those explanations in turn.
64 F. H. Knight, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1965).
63 This section draws on Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Verena Kugi, Innovating Policy,





Politicians often call upon citizens to become more risk taking,
implying that this would increase entrepreneurial activity.65
Superficially that may make sense. However, the situation is more
complex. Not only are cultural values, such as risk taking, deeply
rooted in both humans and society and therefore hard to change. 66
The relationship (if there is one) between the willingness to take risks
and entrepreneurial success is also not linear:67 An increase in the
willingness of people to take risks does not automatically translate
into more successful entrepreneurs. Increased risk-taking may not
necessarily lead to more entrepreneurial activity, and more
entrepreneurial activity may not lead to more entrepreneurial success.
In fact, increased risk-taking may cause an oversupply of risk-takers, a
6s For example, in the UK, politician Patricia Hewitt went so far as to introduce an
"Enterprise Bill." Hewitt Introduces Bill to Boost Enterprise and Prosperity forAll,
HERMES DATABASE, Mar. 26, 2002. Similar reforms are being pursued by Senator John
Kerry in his role as Chair of the Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship.
Senator Kerry's Small Business Priorities, PR NEWSWIRE, Jan. 5, 2007.
66 See Zoltan Acs & Laszlo Szerb, Entrepreneurship, Economic Growth and Public Policy,
28 SMALL BUS. ECON. 109 (2007) (suggesting that culture constrains what public policies
can do to promote entrepreneurial activity); for a study on how to inject an entrepreneurial
spirit in primary and secondary education, see EDUCATIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:
REALITIES, CHALLENGES, POSSIBILITIES (Frederick Hess ed., 2006).
67 The (very tenuous) line of argument is that risk takers are of a particular Myers-Briggs
personality type. Greg Filbeck, Patricia Hatfield & Philip Horvath, Risk Aversion and
Personality Type, 6 J. BEHAV. FIN. 170 (2005). Similarly, entrepreneurs tend to be of the
same Myers-Briggs personality type. Vesa Toutamaa, Awareness ofEntrepreneurial
Personalities: A Prerequisite for Entrepreneurial Education, (National Council for
Graduate Entrepreneurship, Working Paper No. 19, 2007). But cf. Marco Caliendo, Frank
M. Fossen & Alexander S. Kritikos, Risk Attitudes ofNascent Entrepreneurs: New
Evidence from an Experimentally-Validated Survey (IZA Discussion Paper No. 2168,
June 2006) (finding that contrary to conventional wisdom that more risk-averse
individuals are less likely to become entrepreneurs, this is not true for entrepreneurs
coming out of inactivity or unemployment, only for entrepreneurs coming out of regular
employment). See also A. Rauch & M. Freese, Psychological Approaches to
Entrepreneurial Success: A General Model and an Overview of Findings, in
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 101 (C. Cooper
& I. Robertson eds., 2000) (suggesting that risk-taking is only one of many factors shaping
the decision to become an entrepreneur); B. Schiller & P. Crewson, Entrepreneurial
Origins: A Longitudinal Inquiry, 35 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 523 (1997) (empirically finding
that risk-taking is difficult to separate from other factors).
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problematic entrepreneurial "bubble".68  Moving from analysis to
prescription, lawmakers understandably desire a healthy supply of
new entrepreneurs; yet, it may be equally important to have
institutional filters to identify and encourage those entrepreneurs that
are more likely to be successful. In sum, the role of risk-taking
behavior is a potential explanation for entrepreneurial success, but the
exact linkage between the two remains understudied, and thus
difficult for lawmakers to operationalize.
2. INFORMATION-RICH ENTREPRENEURS
Explaining successful entrepreneurship through information
advantages puts the focus on the informational dimension of risk
assessment and suggests that successful entrepreneurs maintain an
information asymmetry in their favor. Classical economic theory
disdains information asymmetries 69 and, when necessary, suggests
regulating the behavior of market actors to ensure informational
balance. Not surprisingly, the legal system is replete with examples of
such information rebalancing - from SEC filing requirements to
nutritional information of foodstuff.7o All these cases share the same
normative aim - to achieve information symmetries. To the extent
that entrepreneurial success rests on information asymmetries,
classical economic theory seems to suggest eliminating the foundation
entrepreneurial activity is built on. Empirical work, however, has
shown that individuals who are knowledgeable in a particular sector
or industry perceive risks to be lower, and thus are able to identify
68 See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN
CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005).
69 A fundamental assumption in the microeconomic theory on markets is "perfect
information." The literature is replete with complexities that arise due to asymmetric
information, most popularly the problems of "moral hazard" and "lemons." See N.
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 484-90 ( 4 th ed. 2007).
70 Publicly traded corporations are required to provide comprehensive information about
their business to shareholders and potential investors through filing requirements with the
SEC. Companies offering investment opportunities are required to make public detailed
information about potential risks. Food producers have to provide nutritional information
to consumers. Pharmaceutical companies have to detail uses, dosage, risks, and side
effects of their drugs to potential users. The auto industry has to let consumers know the
fuel economy of the cars they produce. Polluters have to provide the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) with detailed data about stockpiles of dangerous substances -
data that the EPA then makes public. In a number of states, landlords have to disclose
whether a rented space is contaminated with lead paint.
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entrepreneurial opportunities that others do not see. They succeed
because of the information advantage they have.7'
While this may run contrary to traditional economic theory, a
vocal minority of economists, the so-called "Austrian School," has
suggested that information asymmetries are omnipresent in market
transactions.72 For these economists, the information advantage
argument is perfectly congruent with their larger view of the
functioning of markets.73 The task of the legal system they argue is
precisely not to rebalance information asymmetries. This would only
cause a lamentable reduction of entrepreneurial potential without
outweighing benefits for market competition.
3. ENTREPRENEURS As SUPERIOR EVALUATORS
The third argument focuses on the process of how successful
entrepreneurs weigh risks and rewards. Entrepreneurs are, the
reasoning goes, not necessarily more risk-taking, nor do they have
access to better information. Instead, they are better able to evaluate
risks and rewards. The human ability to evaluate risk has recently
received sustained academic attention. Behavioral economists have
taken a hard look at human behavior, transforming the simplistic idea
of an always-rational homo economicus.74 Psychologists have studied
information evaluation and decision-making of individuals, including
in high-risk/high-reward professions.75 In his popular work on the
/ Sharon Gifford, Risk and Uncertainty, in HANDBOOK OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH
37 (Z. Acs & David Audretsch eds., 2003).
72 The most famous adherents of the "Austrian School" include Carl Menger, Eugen von
B6hm-Bawerk, Friedrich von Wieser, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Joseph
Schumpeter, Gottfried von Haberler, Murray Rothbard, Israel Kirzner, George Reisman,
Henry Hazlitt, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe.
73 See generally Israel M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market
Process: An Austrian Approach, 35 J. EcoN. LIT. 6o (1997) (reviewing Austrian School
economics literature).
74 For the beginning of the field, see Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage
Axioms, 75 Q. J. OF EcON. 643 (1961). For an overview of behavioral economics from the
perspective of law, see Christine Jolls, Behavioral Law and Economics (Nat'i Bureau of
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 12879, 2007), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12879 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
75 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); THOMAS OBERLECHNER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET (2004).
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history of risk, Peter Bernstein has shown how recent our
probabilities-based understanding of evaluating risks is.76 Taken
together, this research suggests that evaluating risks is difficult for
humans, and that some humans may be better at it than others. This
could point towards an explanation of entrepreneurial success.
Yet, even if some humans are better than others, it is unclear
whether entrepreneurs are among those that are better at assessing
risks. As these differences are rooted in us being human, and
embedded in our minds, facilitating entrepreneurial activity by
changing the way we evaluate risks may be difficult. We may not be
able to alter human risk assessment, at least not through the relatively
crude means of laws and regulations.
Simply increasing the amount of risk humans are willing to accept
or changing the way humans process information in their minds may
hold little near-term promise. As a result, policy-makers intending to
assist entrepreneurs may opt for a strategy that is less dependent on
human psyche to change, and more dependent on the information on
which entrepreneurs base their assessments.
Evaluating risks may be a visceral process for some successful
entrepreneurs, while others may engage in a very structured, detailed
analysis. Both groups, however, tend to break up risks into smaller
components that they assess in turn.77 Some of these components the
entrepreneurs think they can control, others are taken out of their
hands because they are shaped by societal, political and economic
contexts. This points to an important differentiation. For "internal"
components, entrepreneurs need to also evaluate their ability to shape
these in accordance with their plans and preferences, while they
cannot do the same for "external" components. For the latter the best
they can hope for is to be able to accurately assess them.
This is a (small) blessing and a (huge) curse. It is a blessing
because it does not require entrepreneurs to factor in change that they
themselves cannot affect, and thus may make evaluating these
components easier. It is a curse because entrepreneurs have little or
no control over these elements of their overall assessment of risks. At
best they can accurately assess these components. Not surprisingly,
therefore, entrepreneurs want to understand the likely trajectory of
these "external" components to evaluate them with sufficient
76 PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK (1996).
77 See European Commission, Eurobarometer Entrepreneurship 42-44 (June 2004)
(differentiating between internal and external factors weighed by potential entrepreneurs).
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precision. What they crave is informational accuracy. Incidentally,
this is where the law can help.
B. THE ROLE OF LAW
For entrepreneurs, "external" risks are what they can assess, but
not control. Each of these risks consists of a cost or benefit and the
probability that it will be incurred. For example, applying for a
subsidy is a potential reward, but receiving it may not be certain - an
entrepreneur has to factor this uncertainty into his or her overall
assessment.
This makes it possible for the law to play a dual role in facilitating
entrepreneurship. First, policies translated into laws can lower the
costs for entrepreneurs. Labor laws can be structured so that hiring
and firing employees is easy and relatively cheap, permitting
entrepreneurial enterprises that grow unevenly to adjust their human
resources swiftly and at low transactional cost.?8 Corporate and tax
laws can be designed to make it easier for startups to obtain outside
funding, through venture capitalists for example, and to provide their
employees with stock options as a means of attracting and retaining
important talent.79 Intellectual property laws can be made to lower
the barriers for being granted a patent, from lowering filing fees to
reducing the paperwork required to file a patent application.so All
these measures are achievable through adjustments of the legal
system; they reduce the cost for an entrepreneur and thus, assuming
fixed probabilities incurring these costs as well as fixed benefits, tilt
the risk/reward equation in the entrepreneur's favor.
It is important to realize that such costs do not vanish. Reducing
them for entrepreneurs often results in these costs being borne by
78 Supra note 6.
79 For a theoretical model and empirical analysis of the impact of tax law on
entrepreneurial activity, see Julie Berry Cullen & Roger H. Gordon, Taxes and
Entrepreneurial Activity: Theory and Evidence for the U.S. (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. W9015, 2002), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=316794 (last visited Apr. 18, 2010).
soSee Lee A. Hollaar, A New Look at Patent Reform, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
743, 754 (2005) (suggesting lowered filing fees); Gerald J. Mossinghoff & Vivian S. Kuo,
World Patent System Circa 2oXX, A.D., 38 IDEA 529, 562 (1998) (arguing for a reduction
in filing fees). In 2004, Congress reduced filing fees to stimulate innovation, especially for
smaller companies. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-356,
ii8 Stat. 3 (2004).
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other groups in our society. For example, changing labor laws to
eliminate severance payments or giving notice when terminating
employment contracts reduces costs for entrepreneurs and thus
facilitates entrepreneurship, but employees (or in states with generous
unemployment benefits, the taxpayers) will bear the consequences
through increased cost (if e.g. they will not receive severance
payments) or heightened risk (in the form of e.g. higher uncertainty of
whether they are made redundant at short notice).8 ' Similarly,
modifying bankruptcy statutes to lower the stigma of failure may help
unsuccessful entrepreneurs to try again, but investors and creditors
shoulder the additional risk (and thus ultimately, the costs) of such
redistribution.82 Lowering risk for entrepreneurs in this way may be
in society's interest, especially when entrepreneurial activity is
perceived to be too low, but it is important for lawmakers to realize
that such actions are not costless.
Law lowers risk and thus external costs for entrepreneurs. While
not often described in these terms, this role of the legal system is
relatively well understood and legislatures have already deliberately or
intuitively employed the law in this way. The legal system may,
however, play a second important role, and this one is ill-understood.
As I have suggested, entrepreneurs weigh risks and differentiate
between those risks that they can influence (which they will attempt to
do) and those external ones that they cannot shape.
Like any risk, external risks consist of two elements, the cost (or
reward) and the probability that it will be incurred. For example, if an
entrepreneur decides to bring a new product to market that may
infringe upon another company's intellectual property rights, the cost
of infringement is relatively straightforward to calculate. Depending
on the legal system, the entrepreneur may be forced to pay damages
(actual, punitive or statutory), fines, and court costs should a court
conclude in the other party's favor. Yet, it is uncertain how the court
will decide. Each possible outcome is associated with a certain
probability. Multiplying the probability of a possible outcome by its
potential cost yields what economists call the expected value (or utility
8 This is the basis of the Danish flexicurity system. See Soren Kaj Andersen & Mikkel
Mailand, The Danish Flexicurity Model (Working Paper 2005), available online at
http://www.sociology.ku.dk/faos/flexicurityskao5.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2010)
(describing the combination of a flexible labor market with strong unemployment
benefits).
82 For an empirical analysis of the role of bankruptcy law on entrepreneurial activity, see
John Armour & Douglas Gumming, The Legislative Road to Silicon Valley, 58 OXFORD
ECON. PAPERS 596 (2006).
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if one takes into account the subjective dimension of decision-
making).83
Law bears on this probability. It can make outcomes more or less
likely to happen. If, for example, intellectual property required
relatively little evidence for an infringement case to succeed, the
probability that an infringement will lead to actual cost for the
infringer will increase. This rather direct linkage between probability
of external events and entrepreneurial risk may suggest that, to
facilitate entrepreneurship, the law ought to aim at lowering the
probability for external costs entrepreneurs typically face (or
increasing the probability of receiving a subsidy).84
Yet, this strategy suffers from two weaknesses. First, it
necessitates that lawmakers can identify the relevant factors without
causing inefficiencies through under- or over-inclusiveness. For
example, making it harder for intellectual property rights holders to
sue rights infringers may encourage undesired free-riding. Second, it
rests on the capacity and willingness of legislators to treat
entrepreneurs more favorably than others. In some circumstances
this may trigger equal protection concerns. More importantly, such a
stance of preferential treatment may be politically difficult to defend.8
There is another and more promising way through which the legal
system can aid entrepreneurs. It rests on the understanding that
entrepreneurs try to shape and assess internal and assess external
factors when estimating risks. Given the many uncertainties
associated with the multitude of factors, entrepreneurs may - given
unchanged expected value - prefer to know exactly whether they will
incur particular costs. For example, rather than having a fifty percent
chance of receiving a subsidy, entrepreneurs may prefer a hundred
83 For the narrative of expected value theory, see Mark J. Machina, Choice Under
Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved, 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 121 (1987). It is
important to note here that not all expected values are equally enticing to all actors - richer
actors may find less subjective value in gaining an extra dollar than less affluent ones; this
has led to an adjustment from expected value to expected utility. For the sake of simplicity
I do not introduce the difference in this paper; suffice to say that subjective utility rather
than objective value is what influences entrepreneurial decision-making. See generally
JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
(1953).
84 This is similar to what James Gibson has recently described in the context of IP laws.
See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L. J. 882 (2007).
85 To be sure, as the EPC literature explains in much detail, such a superficial view is, well,
superficial.
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percent chance - and thus absolute certainty - to receiving half of the
subsidy. The expected value in both instances is the same, but the
latter offers entrepreneurs certainty.
Such a view would suggest that the role of the legal system in
facilitating entrepreneurial activity is to reduce the uncertainties8 6
that entrepreneurs perceive.87 This can be done many different ways.
Clarifying the tax code reduces the uncertainty for businesses in
paying taxes. Uncertainty may also be lowered through changes in
civil procedure and the court system to ensure that more trials lead to
expected outcomes. Similarly, setting clear rules for granting
intellectual property rights lowers uncertainty. These measures link
the legal system in its role as facilitating entrepreneurial activity to its
role in delivering transparency and certainty.88 In fact, one could
argue that one of the reasons for the entrepreneurial success in the
United States is the relative transparency and predictability of its legal
system - often summarized under the rubric of a functioning "rule of
law" compared to other societies. 89 Importantly, such measures
would not increase the overall societal cost; the total expected value
would stay constant. In sum, strengthening the rule of law -
86 I use the term "uncertainty" here with caution and in the general sense. In the risk
literature, the term at times is used to denote the unknown portion of probabilities. See
Knight, supra note 64.
87 It is important to note in this context that what counts are perceptions, not objective
values, as humans make decisions based on their perceptions, not based on access to an
objective truth.
88 See Rafael La Porta et al., supra note 62; see also Katharina Pistor, Law as a
Determinant for Equity Market Development: The Experience of Transition Economies,
in PETER MURRELL, ASSESSING THE VALUE OF LAW IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 249 (2001);
Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions?,
120 Q.J. ECON. 223 (2005) (finding that investment performance in private equity
investment was better in common law countries, arguably because of a superior legal
framework for such investments).
89 This is certainly the view of the legal institutions literature. See Edward Glaeser, Rafael
La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrew Shleifer, Do Institutions Cause Growth?,
9 J. ECON. GROWTH 271 (2004); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 62. For an
extensive treatment of the subject, see KENNETH W. DAM, THE LAW - GROWTH NExuS -
THE RULE OF LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006). For the developing world, see
Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian & Francesco Trebbi, Institutions Rule: The Primacy of
Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development, 9 J. ECON.
GROWTH 65 (2004); Boettke & Coyne, supra note 39; Lerner & Schoar, supra note 88. For
a research agenda on the role of courts and the rule of law for entrepreneurship, see Smith
& Ueda, supra note 4, at 241-46.
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clarifying legal rules to be more predictable and reducing uncertainty
of legal processes - fosters and sustains entrepreneurial activity.
In one sense, however, reducing uncertainty to stimulate
entrepreneurial activity seems counter-intuitive. Aren't entrepreneurs
risk-takers that thrive on uncertainty rather than shying away from it?
Of course; but if humans are weak at evaluating risks and dealing with
uncertainty, increasing certainty (and thus pushing the probability of
an event as far as possible towards either o or i) may have a positive
effect. It may prompt some entrepreneurs to act and other individuals
to join the ranks of entrepreneurs, thus increasing the entrepreneurial
pool. Because expected values remain constant, there would be no
direct societal cost associated with such a reduction of uncertainty.9o
Lowering uncertainty, while leaving expected values unchanged, then,
is the second role the legal system can play in facilitating
entrepreneurial activity.
The understanding that lowering uncertainty may lead directly to
more entrepreneurial activity is well aligned with what economists
have termed "expected utility theory." It suggests that risk-averse
human beings are willing to pay for certainty. For example,
individuals may prefer the certainty of receiving a third of a subsidy to
a fifty percent chance of receiving all of it. The difference between a
third and a half is the price paid for certainty. Assuming this is true,
lawmakers could take the certainty strategy one step further and lower
payouts to entrepreneurs in return for increased predictability.91
Unfortunately, expected utility theory has shortcomings. In
particular, experimental economists have found that how much risk
an individual is willing to accept is not constant. Experiments have
shown that humans tend to change their assessment of risk as
potential payoffs increase.92 The more money at stake, the less risk-
taking people tend to be. This suggests that lawmakers may want to
prioritize increasing predictability to high payoff cases, i.e. situations
where high benefits (or costs) are at stake for entrepreneurs.
9o To be sure, reducing uncertainty is not costless. Better laws may require better
preparation; better legal processes may require better training of judges, more personnel,
etc.
91 Whether and how much can be saved depends on the risk threshold of the group in
question, and is likely a complex calculation.
92 See Hans Binswanger, Attitudes Towards Risk: Theoretical Implications of an
Experiment in Rural India, 91 EcON. J. 364 (1981); Steven Kachelmeier & Mohamed
Shehata, Examining Risk Preferences Under High Monetary Incentives: Experimental
Evidence from the People's Republic of China, 8a AM. ECON. REV. 5 (1982); Charles Holt &
Susan Laury, Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 5 (2002).
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Behavioral economics has added yet another important wrinkle to
the story, showing that an individual's decision about what risks to
accept for what rewards depends substantially on whether the
individual hopes to gain or fears to lose. Humans are more risk-
averse when they consider potential gains, and more risk-taking when
they evaluate potential losses or cost.93 This would suggest that
lawmakers should focus on making legal rules more certain for
financial benefits offered to entrepreneurs, like subsidies, rather than
costs, like taxes, as entrepreneurs value certainty more on the upside.
Yet, experiments have revealed humans tend to understand
potential gains or losses by how they are being presented ("framed").
Kahneman and Tversky have shown that when the same prospect is
framed in terms of a potential gain, humans prefer certainty, while if it
is termed as a potential loss, humans are more accepting of chance.94
This has consequences for how the law ought to be used to facilitate
entrepreneurial activity. On the most superficial level, it may suggest
that wherever uncertainty can be decreased through reform of the
legal system, it ought to be described in terms of gains rather than
losses. A bit more sophisticated approach may suggest that given the
same level of predictability, lawmakers should offer a potential gain
rather than threaten a potential loss.
To summarize, the theory of risk offers a framework for
understanding the role of law in encouraging (or discouraging)
entrepreneurial activity. Through changes in the legal system, direct
costs for entrepreneurs can be lowered. Law can also influence the
probability of incurring a cost even when holding expected values (and
thus costs for taxpayers) constant, thus prompting more people to
engage in entrepreneurial activity. Behavioral economics has shown
that lowering uncertainty does not offer the same gains across the
board. In particular, the framing of a prospect - whether as a
potential gain or loss - influences how humans evaluate the
associated risk. Lawmakers can use the lens of risk to understand the
role of law in facilitating entrepreneurial activity and design more
effective legislation. The strength of the approach lies in it being both
comprehensive - covering all aspects of entrepreneurial activity - and
93 Bruno Frey, Entscheidungsanomalien, 41 PYSCHOLOGISCHE RUNDSCHAU 67-83 (1990);
THOMAS OBERLECHNER, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FOREIGN ExCHANGE MARKETS 71-88 (2004).
94 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis ofDecision
under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices,
Values and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 341 (1984); OBERLECHNER, supra note 93, at
71-88 (discussing high risk decision-making in foreign exchange).
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operational. It thus is more useful than the more particularistic views
of the role of law that were mapped out in Part II. Unfortunately, the
conceptual lens is not without its own shortcomings.
IV. OVERCOMING CONCEPTUAL WEAKNESSES
THROUGH RADICAL INNOVATION
The traditional model I have presented in Part III provides a
rather stylized and sequential understanding of how innovation
works. Technology is ascribed to be the disruptive agent of change.
Entrepreneurs identify and refine technologies in order to seize
entrepreneurial opportunities. This is the moment of "entrepreneurial
disruption." It is achieved by a special individual, the entrepreneur,
and driven by technological change. In this model, entrepreneurs
change the world through technology. They are the driving force and
the lead actors in entrepreneurship. Law plays only a minor,
supporting role.
This view sees technology as the mechanism of change in the
hands of a special group of human beings. It is a variant of
technological determinism, the view that the seeds of change are
already embedded in technology. Entrepreneurs take these seeds and
grow them. Such a conceptualization of the interface between
technology and society has been criticized as too linear.95 It fails to
take into account the many other elements of society in shaping
technology. The reality is much more a process of repeated trial-and-
error, in which many actors, institutions, and processes shape the
trajectory of the entrepreneurial product.96
These new theories, often termed "constructivist," posit a more
complex, heterogeneous interplay of the various agents and
mechanisms involved in innovation and lay out their argument using
rich, detailed case studies. For example, Thomas Hughes has argued
95 See Trevor J. Pinch & Wiebe E. Bijker, The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts:
Or How the Sociology ofScience and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit Each
Other, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE
SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 22 (Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes & Trevor
Pinch eds., 1989).
96 The general role of users in innovation has recently gained traction in mainstream legal
academic discourse. See Katherine J. Strandburg, Users as Innovators: Implications for
Patent Doctrine, Mar. 2007, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=969399 (last visited
Apr. 18, 2010). For path-breaking work on the subject, see ERIC VON HIPPEL, THE SOURCES
OF INNOVATION (1988) (arguing that users, manufacturers, and suppliers play important
roles in the innovation process).
2010] 181L
I/S: A JOURNAL OF JAW AND POLICY
that a technical innovation takes place within a technological system
and may gain a "technological momentum" that pushes the innovation
in a certain direction irrespective of the will of the innovative
entrepreneur who initially conceived of it.97 Others have advanced
what has been termed the "actor-network approach,"98 suggesting that
the interplay resembles "heterogeneous networks of human and
nonhuman actors."99 Finally, Wiebe Bijker'oo and Trevor Pinch have
advanced a theory of the "social construction of technology" (SCOT),lol
in which the innovative process is described "as an alternation of
variation and selection"1o2 that is "multi-directional," rather than
linear.1o3 In particular, they show that users of products play a
fundamental role in the innovative process, as do other contextual
factors.
While each constructivist theory of technological change has a
unique take on innovation, they share a common thread: they offer
both theoretical reasons and empirical facts to undermine the
conventional linear model of innovation. If these critiques have merit,
then the conceptual lens of risk and entrepreneurship may suffer from
a fundamental weakness - a flawed underlying conception of how
innovation, particularly in the context of entrepreneurship, actually
97 Thomas P. Hughes, NETWORKS OF POWER: ELECTRIFICATION IN WESTERN SOCIETY:
1880-1930 (1983); see also Thomas P. Hughes, Technological Momentum, in DOES
TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 101-113
(Merrit Roe Smith & Leo Marx eds., 1994).
98 See Michel Callon, The Sociology of an Actor-Network, in MAPPING THE DYNAMICS OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE IN THE REAL WORLD 19-34 (Michel
Callon, John Law & Arie Rip eds., 1986); BRUNO LATOUR, THE PASTEURIZATION OF FRANCE
(1984); John Law, Technology and Heterogeneous Engineering: The Case of Portuguese
Expansion, in THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, supra note 95, at
111-34.
99 See Wiebe E. Bijker, Sociohistorical Technology Studies, in HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 251 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds., 1995).
100 WIEBE BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS (1995).
1o Modeled on the "empirical program of relativism" (EPOR) in the realm of the sociology
of science. See Pinch & Bijker, supra note 95.
102 Pinch & Bijker, supra note 95, at 28.
103 See also CLAUDE S. FISCHER, AMERICA CALLING - SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONY TO
1940 (1992); SUSAN DOUGLAS, INVENTING AMERICAN BROADCASTING: 1899-1922 (1987).
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works. This, in turn, has significant consequences for the role of law
in facilitating entrepreneurial activity.
The conceptual lens described in Part III has portrayed law as
having two fundamental, reactive roles associated with lowering risks
for entrepreneurs: directly lowering the cost for entrepreneurial
activity (or increase the gains to be had), and increasing predictability.
Either way, law is facilitating, but not directly creating,
entrepreneurial opportunities. If, however, constructivist theorists
are correct and this conceptual lens is inaccurate because it is
incomplete, then demographic groups other than entrepreneurs may
play important roles in the innovation process. Assisting these groups
may lead to entrepreneurial success. Consequently, lawmakers may
want to investigate such unorthodox ways of stimulating the
innovative process.
It may also be inaccurate, if we follow constructivist theories, to
see in technology the central mechanism that drives the
entrepreneurial process. In fact, the legal system may just be another
such mechanism. I have already said as much when describing law as
an enabler in Part II, explaining how law could function to facilitate
entrepreneurial activity. Now, based on the constructivist
conceptualization of the innovation process within a socio-technical
context, I am suggesting that law performs a much more central
mechanism that is embedded in our understanding of the
entrepreneurial process itself. Conceived this way, law can actively
shape the trajectory of entrepreneurial endeavors by altering how
technology is being shaped through societal constraints. In setting
these constraints, law's role is not only central, but also active.
This has significant consequences for whether, when, and how
legislators ought to employ law to foster entrepreneurial activity.
First, if the constructivists are correct and innovation is happening in
a heterogeneous network of many elements, there is no inherent
benefit to legal inaction. Second, if entrepreneurial activity is multi-
directional rather than linear, with multiple paths and a complex
interplay of enabling mechanisms, then experimenting with these
mechanisms is not an automatically inferior strategy, despite the fact
that it disrupts long-term predictability. Third, conceived this way,
there is no intrinsic disadvantage for using the legal system
preemptively to try to facilitate the right mix for entrepreneurial
success.
Such a conception of law contradicts the conventional wisdom of
how the legal system ought to function. Most legal scholars believe
that the law should be reactive, slow, and predictable, in order to
decrease uncertainty. By contrast, the more nuanced conception of
the innovafion process put forward by the constructivists suggests that
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the law should be used proactively as a mechanism of entrepreneurial
facilitation. Legislators intent on stimulating entrepreneurship
should seize potential opportunities to create regulatory tensions that
entrepreneurs can exploit to upset existing markets with radical new
offerings, thereby stimulating economic activity. The constructivist
approach also implies that under certain conditions it may be
advantageous to legislate in an iterative and adaptive fashion
(although this may be difficult to achieve in today's ad hoc-ish political
processes). In short, lawmakers desiring to facilitate entrepreneurial
activity could use the law in an entrepreneurial fashion, acting swiftly,
risking errors, and adapting fast to changing circumstances.
Such behavior creates winners as well as losers. It will likely upset
incumbent players in the market, who will lament the loss of
predictability. But by creating regulatory friction - by bringing
change to the market - these new laws also create entrepreneurial
opportunities. Whether and to what extent society ought to help
entrepreneurs relative to existing businesses is a political decision, not
a legal one, and not one that I address here. What is important,
however, is to understand that the legal system offers an effective
mechanism of promoting market change that is more powerful than is
generally thought.
Using the law in a proactive, opportunistic, flexible, and risk-
taking fashion may sound alien to our conventional wisdom, but
surprisingly, perhaps it is not completely novel to lawmakers. The
regulatory reform of Europe's mobile telephony market is one
example. In the late 198os, the European Commission decided to
push for an early regulatory framework for third generation digital
wireless telephony.104 What emerged was a regulatory framework that
set a common technical standard (and frequency) and mandated that
providers permit subscribers to use each other's networks (what we
today call "roaming").o5 The European lawmakers acted early, before
all technical details were settled. Its decision to pick a winner and
impose roaming was risky and was criticized by many observers at the
104 See Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success Story, 8 EUR. J. OF
PUB. POL'Y 432 (2001); J. Funk, Competition Between Regional Standards and the Success
and Failure ofFirms in the World-Wide Mobile Communication Market, 22 TELECOMM.
POL'Y 419 (1998).
105 Peter F. Cowhey, Jonathan D. Aronson & John E. Richards, The Peculiar Evolution of
3G Networks, in How REVOLUTIONARY WAS THE DIGITAL. REVOLUTION? 291, 314 (John
Zysman & Abraham Newman eds., 2006).
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time.1o6 Moreover, the mobile telephony rules were repeatedly
adjusted over the next decade, increasing uncertainty.o7 By contrast,
regulators in the United States, did not want to intervene and impose
a common technical standard or frequency for digital mobile
telephony.os Technical innovation and market forces were deemed
the preferred mechanisms for entrepreneurial success.
The European approach of using law to facilitate entrepreneurship
by disrupting existing economic equilibria - that is, using law in a
Schumpeterian sense - brought about a thriving mobile phone market
with innumerable entrepreneurial opportunities and assisted in
making the European Global System for Mobile Communications
(GSM) standard the global leader.o9 In contrast, in the United States,
technical innovation and the forces of competition did not prove
sufficient for similar entrepreneurial success, partly because the
peculiar economics of network industries failed to unleash the forces
of competition. A decade-and-a-half after the first GSM network
began operating in Europe, the United States remained locked in an
inferior position.11o
The case of GSM offers a vivid example of a more entrepreneurial
approach to law. It does not, however, establish that such an
approach was the main cause of Europe's GSM success. As we are
moving from linear to multi-directional theories of innovation and
innovative entrepreneurship, in part stimulated by constructivist
theories, we must forego the temptation to single out factors and
attribute central causality to them. If the non-linear theories tell us
anything, they tell us that success has many "fathers." Law, like
technology, is just one mechanism, one tool that may facilitate
success. This may also point towards an agenda for future research on
the role of law. Through comprehensive case studies to understand
1o6 See generally Peter Grindley & David J. Salant, Standards Wars: The Use ofStandard
Setting as a means ofFacilitating Cartels: Third Generation Wireless
Telecommunications Standard Setting, 3 INT'L J. COMM. L. & POL'Y 2 (1999).
107 Id.
108 Cowhey, supra note 105, at 314. See generally Howard A. Shelanski, Competition and
Deployment ofNew Technology in U.S. Telecommunications, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 85
(2000); Megan S. Webster, Third Generation Wireless: Will the United States Flourish or
Flounder in the Global Race to Launch Third Generation Services?, 13 DEPAUL Bus. L.J.
309 (2000).
log See Lazer & Mayer-Schbnberger supra note 32, at 832-33.
110 Id.; See also "The Tortoise and the Hare," THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 2002.
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whether, how, and why law was able to facilitate entrepreneurship, we
may gain a better understanding of the underlying dynamics among
the various factors and mechanisms of innovation. This, in turn, may
help lawmakers make better use of such entrepreneurial law in the
future.
The case also does not prove that entrepreneurial law is always
worth the risks involved. As with any entrepreneurial endeavor, for
every success there are numerous failures. While the EU had fifteen
years of fantastic success in the mobile phone sector, the same
mechanism of Schumpeterian law failed to facilitate a similar success
in digital television."' Using the law in this entrepreneurial fashion
can sometimes result in resources spent on endeavors that fail.
Finally, the case also does not prove that using law in a
Schumpeterian sense works for all contexts, sectors, and industries.
Perhaps the specifics of telecommunication networks - like strong
network externalities, lock-in, and switching costs - caused
Schumpeterian law to succeed, pointing towards a differentiated
approach. The recent rise of Wi-Fi, wireless internet access, offers
another success story to tell in the telecommunication context. Here,
very early on, the United States Federal Communications Commission
designated some radio spectrum as available for use without need for
a license.112 This unlicensed spectrum, once technology was available
to make use of it, created vast entrepreneurial opportunities for
equipment and service providers alike to provide millions of users
with wireless network connectivity at high speeds. It influenced the
creation of similar unlicensed spectrums throughout the world and
shaped the landscape of internet access.113
Whether lawmakers want to be entrepreneurial or not is up to
them. Policymakers may well decide that an approach that emulates
that of entrepreneurs is not for them. Not every legislature, just like
not every human being, has the nerve, the conviction, the drive, and
perhaps the foolishness, to be entrepreneurial. Entrepreneurship
In See Xuidian Dai et al., The Rise and Fall of High Definition Television: The Impact of
European Technology, 34 J. COMMON MKT. STUDIES 2, 149-66 (1996).
112 Authorization of Spread Spectrum Systems Under Parts 15 and go of the FCC Rules and
Regulations, FCC 85-245 (1985).
"3 See Philip J. Weiser & Dale N. Hatfield, Market Regulation and Innovation: Policing
the Spectrum Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 663 (2005). See also Yochai Benkler, Some
Economics of Wireless Commnunicutions, i6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25 (2002) (providing a
narrative of the FCC's role in the new spectrum policy).
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comes with great risks, but also offers huge rewards for those that
succeed.
Moreover, the conclusion derived from a deeper understanding of
the multiple components at play in the innovation dynamic offers two
important insights. The first is that law can be a powerful and, at
times, effective societal mechanism to foster entrepreneurial
opportunities (and thus entrepreneurial activity). The second is that
there is nothing inherent in this legal mechanism that fosters
entrepreneurship any better (or worse) than other mechanisms at
society's disposal (like financial subsidies to entrepreneurs).
Entrepreneurial law as I have described it may lead to spectacular
successes or horrendous failures (and all possible results in between),
even in the hands of knowledgeable and careful legislators.
Conceptualizing innovation as a societal process rather than a
linear one driven by innovators and technology, however, helps us see
law as a component of the innovation dynamic rather than a static
element in the societal backdrop against which innovative
entrepreneurship takes place. We have much to gain from more and
deeper studies of the concrete role of law in the innovation dynamic
and I hope we will see significantly more research in the coming years.
Ultimately, this may lead us to use the law as an effective tool to shape
and stimulate entrepreneurial activity.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The relationship between law and entrepreneurship is frequently
described in antagonistic terms. In Part II of this article I gave three
reasons why this is a fallacy. Law, I suggested, can act as enabler,
leveler, and enforcer that facilitates rather than hinders
entrepreneurial activity. To understand that law can be useful does
not, however, help lawmakers in comprehending how to use law to
stimulate entrepreneurial activity. In Part III, therefore, I offered a
comprehensive framework of the relationship between
entrepreneurship and law. I suggested an understanding of
entrepreneurs as reflective risk-takers. This suggestion was based on
recent research in behavioral economics and the psychology of
decision-making, which in turn makes it possible to conceptualize the
role of law.
However, as I argued in Part IV, such a framework is not without
shortcomings, the starkest of which is its reliance on a linear concept
of innovative entrepreneurship in which an entrepreneur uses
technology as the single agent of change. Recent social theories of
technology have shown that innovation is not linear, but multi-
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directional, involving more actors and a multitude of mechanisms.
Consequently, this points towards a significantly more prominent role
of law in the dynamic of innovation and entrepreneurship. Contrary
to traditional views of the law as static and reactive, this suggests that
law can - if better understood - be used more timely and pro-actively.
Such "Schumpeterian" law holds significant promise as a stimulus of
entrepreneurship, but is not without risks. This should be reason
enough to study the role of law in the innovation dynamic rather than
conceptualizing it as both static and exogenous and thus better
understand the risks (and rewards) involved in using the law
entrepreneurially to stimulate entrepreneurship.
